International Lawyer
Volume 26

Number 3

Article 10

1992

Argentina - A Judicial Court Intervenes in an Arbitration Started
under the International Chamber of Commerce Rules
Emilio J. Cardenas

Recommended Citation
Emilio J. Cardenas, Argentina - A Judicial Court Intervenes in an Arbitration Started under the
International Chamber of Commerce Rules, 26 INT'L L. 789 (1992)
https://scholar.smu.edu/til/vol26/iss3/10

This Current Developments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has
been accepted for inclusion in International Lawyer by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more
information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

EMILIO J. CARDENAS*

Argentina-A Judicial Court Intervenes
in an Arbitration Started Under the
International Chamber of Commerce
Rules
The rule of [public policy] which takes precedence of all other in a case like this, is that
people must be bound by the arrangements they have made; a principle which the
Judges are most reluctant to apply to arbitration.'
For the past two decades private companies from all over the world have
substantially increased their activities and participation in the various segments
of the Argentine oil and gas sector. Concurrent with such developments, private
parties involved in oil and gas activities have demonstrated a growing interest in
arbitration (normally the result of a contractual arrangement between the parties)
as a dispute resolution mechanism. The increased attraction towards arbitration
as a private way to settle commercial disputes and to deliberately avoid ordinary
state jurisdiction (in fact, contracting out of ordinary state jurisdiction) has generated an initial preference for arbitration to be governed by the International
Chamber of Commerce Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration (ICC Rules). Recently, in Perez Companc v. Ecofisa S.A. ,2 the Commercial Court of Appeals of
the City of Buenos Aires had to decide on the limits of the applicability of the
ICC Rules to a domestic arbitration.
*Cdrdenas, Cassagne & Asociados, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
1. Appleson v. Littlewords, [19391 1 All E.R. 464 (Scott, L.J.).
2. Reported in 143 EL DERECHO, Sept. 17, 1991, at 436.
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I. The Background
In 1977 Perez Companc S.A. (PC) and Bridas S.A. (B) entered into an
agreement with Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF), the Argentine stateowned oil and gas enterprise. PC and B agreed to perform various production
services for YPF. One year after entering into the agreement, PC and B hired
Ecofisa S.A. (E) and Petrofisa S.A. (P) to collaborate on the performance of
certain services required of PC and B in connection with their contract with YPF.
Under the corresponding agreement PC and B paid $2,500 to E and P as a
downpayment and also agreed to pay them additional fees based on output
increases of the oil and gas produced for YPF.
Six years later, a new administration led by President Alfonsin decided by
decree 3870/84 to terminate various YPF contracts, including (but not limited to)
the one that was approved by decree 18.852/77. E and P's point of view was that
PC and B, notwithstanding the termination, still had available a commercial
option or possibility to continue rendering the services under the 1977 contract
by specifically including them in a new contract with YPF. PC and B, in fact,
entered into a new agreement with YPF that was later approved by decree
23.338/84.
In short, PC and B apparently felt they had the opportunity to rid themselves
of E and P since the 1977 contract was terminated by decree 3870/84. E and P
argued, instead, that PC and B could and should have avoided the frustration of
their old service agreement by including them in the new contractual framework
bargained with YPF. This dispute could not be solved by direct bargaining.
The agreement between PC and B and E and P contained a specific clause
through which all disputes had to be settled by arbitration under the system of
administered arbitration governed by the ICC Rules, by one or more arbitrators
appointed in accordance with such Rules. The selected arbitration mechanism,
therefore, contained an element external to the Argentine legal system. Reference to the ICC Rules, it could be argued, thus made the arbitration an international one.
II. The "Terms of Reference"
As the contractual arbitration procedures progressed, the parties could not
agree upon the specific subject that was to be arbitrated. They could not, therefore, decide on the contents of the so-called "Terms of Reference," a procedural
document that (inter alia) must contain the definition of the specific issues to be
arbitrated. This document (also known as compromis) is the one that, inter alia,
gives some protection against subsequent attacks on an award that claim the
arbitrators exceeded their authority. This is important since it relates to the
possible resort to a well-known defense, that of ultra petita.
PC and B claimed that the dispute involved not only a business dispute, but
also the interpretation of an "act of state" (decree 3870/84, they argued, was
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clearly a noncontractual matter), and because of its nature, the arbitrators could
not decide the dispute. PC and B, thus, directly raised the issue of the arbitrability of the subject of the dispute (not all disputes are arbitrable since legal
systems do not allow unlimited submission of disputes to arbitration).
The fundamental (positive) condition of arbitrability is that the parties must be
able to dispose of the matter in dispute. Such alienable matters are those connected with contractual and commercial relations and also with property rights.
The barrier, that is, the negative condition to arbitrability, is public policy (ordre
public) whenever it is involved. 3
PC and B refused to accept or execute the Terms of Reference. At E and P's
request and pursuant to article 13.2 of the ICC Rules, the arbitrators determined
the respective Terms of Reference. From there they moved forward with the
arbitration procedures as they had contractually agreed.
III. A Move to Restrain Arbitration
PC and B, in view of the foregoing, went to court. They appeared before a
Buenos Aires trial commercial judge requesting that he lead the parties in the
process of defining the contents of the Terms of Reference. PC and B maintained
that (notwithstanding the reference to the ICC Rules) the arbitration was an
internal or domestic one. They maintained that it was subject to the Argentine
Code of Procedures, which requires (in the event of disagreement on the Terms
of Reference) the Terms of Reference to be determined by the parties or by the
court through an ad hoc regulated procedure.
PC and B's underlying argument was that judicial control over the arbitrability of the subject matter to be decided by arbitration cannot be waived under
Argentine law. They claimed that in domestic arbitration total insulation of the
arbitration procedures from the procedural rules of the lex loci arbitri is not
possible. In other words, in view of the type of contract (an entirely internal
one, at least from a pure geographical criterion), delocalization was not
possible.
The defendants stated, instead, that the Argentine Code of Procedures was not
applicable since the Arbitral Tribunal endorsed by the ICC had already determined the Terms of Reference according to ICC's specific procedural rules. In
addition, the parties had formally accepted these procedural rules. They therefore requested the trial judge to declare that he lacked jurisdiction to decide on
the issue.
The trial commercial judge agreed with the defendants and refused the stay. As
requested by E and P, the judge declared that the arbitration agreement deprived
him of jurisdiction to decide the case. The judge further held that, as the law

3. Anghelos C. Foustomos, Conditions Requiredfor the Validity of an ArbitrationAgreement,
J. INT'L ARB., Dec. 1988, at 120.
FALL 1992
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permits any person to subject himself to arbitration, and since the subject matter
of the arbitration was of a patrimonial nature, the jurisdiction of state judges
could not go beyond analyzing whether the disputes that the parties wanted
decided by the arbitrators were of the kind forbidden by the law.
PC and B appealed the decision. They based their position on four main
arguments:
(a) First, they criticized the judge's failure to recognize that the discussions
were part of an internal or domestic arbitration, and, as such, were
subject to the provisions of the Argentine Code of Procedures;
(b) second, they argued that, under the Code, the judge necessarily had to,
in case of disagreement, intervene and define (together with the parties)
the Terms of Reference of the arbitration;
(c) third, they claimed that sovereign acts (precisely like decree 3870/84)
could not be subject to review in arbitration, and that nobody other than
a judge could make a decision on its validity as a matter of public policy;
and
(d) fourth, they took the position that the trial judge had not issued an
opinion on whether the arbitrators could decide on the existence of the
contracts that had been terminated by governmental acts, such matter not
being an arbitrable one under the Argentine Code of Procedures.
Although the arbitration was not subject to the Argentine procedural law (but
instead to ICC Rules), it nonetheless has a duty to respect the procedural public
policy rules of Argentina as the place of arbitration. If the public policy is
disregarded by the parties or by the arbitrators, the arbitration procedures may
become null and void regardless of whether the arbitration rules were sufficient
to settle the dispute without the need to apply Argentine procedural law.
IV. The Point of View of the
Commercial Court of Appeals
According to the Commercial Court of Appeals' final decision, the matters to
be decided by it were limited only to the following:
(a) whether the arbitrators could, when confronted with a disagreement between the parties, draft the Terms of Reference themselves;
(b) whether the ICC Tribunal was empowered to decide any and all disputes
among the parties; and
(c) whether the Argentine judiciary had jurisdiction to decide matters submitted to the arbitrators of the kind the Argentine Code of Procedures
forbids to be submitted to arbitration on public policy grounds.
In short, the controversy was then limited to determining whether, in the event
the parties could not agree on the contents of the Terms of Reference, the judge
should apply the Argentine Code of Procedures or respect the ICC Rules. Since
an internal arbitration confronted the Court of Appeals, it decided that the vaVOL. 26, NO. 3
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lidity of the laws and regulations enacted by the Argentine Government could not
be submitted to arbitrators. The defendants had not expressly objected to the
validity of decree 3870/84. That notwithstanding, the manner in which the Terms
of Reference were drafted did not assure that the arbitrators could not be forced
to do precisely that.
The court considered the arbitrators' absence of jurisdiction to be obvious, and
the arbitrators could not decide per se on the arbitrability of the matters objected
to by the plaintiffs. Therefore, in the absence of an agreement on the matters to
be arbitrated, the court decided that it should intervene with the parties to
determine the specific contents of the Terms of Reference; thus, it would ensure
that the contents did not violate Argentine public policy. Once the Terms of
Reference were determined, the court stated that the arbitration procedures
should continue as originally agreed by the parties.
The court further found that even if the 1977 contract was, in fact, frustrated
by a supervening impossibility (its termination by decree 3870/84), the arbitration clause contained therein (with the public policy caveat mentioned above) had
autonomy and was still enforceable. The court, nevertheless, did not allow
arbitrators to decide an issue of public law. A constructive approach was used and
a healthy outcome resulted, evidencing some restraint and reluctance by the
court to unnecessarily interfere in the arbitration proceedings.
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